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A Moment of Truth on Racially
Based Admissions
By LARRY M. LAVINSKY*
Introduction
Three years after the nondecision in DeFunis v. Odegaard,1 Bakke
v. Regents of the University of California' presents the United
States Supreme Court with another opportunity to pass upon the consti-
tutionality of special admissions programs in which racial quotas are
used as a means of increasing the representation of certain racial and
ethnic minorities in professional schools. In neither case was the school
shown to have previously discriminated against nonwhites, nor were
those preferentially admitted shown to have suffered any specific wrong
entitling them to special treatment. Rather, such minority group mem-
bers were the beneficiaries of a program aimed at achieving commenda-
ble social objectives that, due to the limited number of places, had to be
achieved at the expense of better qualified white applicants.
In his dissenting opinion in DeFunis, Mr. Justice Douglas coupled
a rejection of racial preference programs with an eloquent plea for an
admissions scheme utilizing flexible criteria through which the ability
and potential of applicants could be determined "on an individual basis,
rather than according to racial classifications."' It was the earnest hope
of those civil rights organizations that supported DeFunis that the
academic community would heed Justice Douglas's plea. This has not
occurred.
Indeed, a leading law school whose special admissions program is
based on race candidly admitted in a recent report on special admissions
* Member, New York Bar; Chairman of the National Civil Rights Committee of
the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith.
1. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Deci-
slon" With a Message, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 520 (1975).
2. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
3. 416 U.S. at 341 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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that only when Bakke was before the California Supreme Court did it
seem "important . . . to begin to discover the state of the art on
constitutionally safe approaches to special admission programs."4 Ac-
cording to this report, contacts with forty other law schools to learn
whether they "had produced information and ideas for systems of
admissions that eschewed racial criteria in favor of criteria of disadvan-
tage [revealed that] there is no real body of experience in dealing with a
disadvantagement approach to special admissions in law school."5 The
report concluded that, "to the extent that law schools have special
admissions programs of any substance, they operate along racial rather
than economic or other lines, although some schools prefer not to
advertise that fact."'
The grace period provided by the nondecision in DeFunis could
and should have been used to develop a "body of experience' in dealing
with nondiscriminatory admissions criteria. The failure of the academic
community to formulate such criteria made it inevitable that a new test
case would come before the Court.' That failure has also hardened
opposing positions due to the economic recession, the dearth of federal
funds for higher education, the questionable results of special admis-
sions programs utilizing preferential racial criteria, and the increasing
realization among white applicants that they too have a right not to be
discriminated against.
DeFunis and Bakke Compared
While the basic issue raised by DeFunis is also presented in Bakke,
the context in which the latter reaches the Supreme Court differs
significantly. In DeFunis, the highest court of the State of Washington,
with only a single dissent, upheld the minority admissions program of
the University of Washington Law School. In Bakke, the Supreme
Court of the State of California, likewise with only a single dissent,
declared unconstitutional the special admissions program of the Univer-
sity of California at Davis Medical School. In DeFunis, the evidence
did not establish the existence of a fixed quota, and the law school was
able to argue that there was no quota at all. In Bakke, however, there
was an express finding of a fixed quota under which sixteen of one
4. REPORT ON SPECIAL ADMISSIONS AT BOALT HALL AFTER BAKKE 1 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as SPECIAL ADMISSIONS].
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id.
7. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Bakke. Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
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hundred places in each entering class were reserved for special admis-
sion applicants, and a further finding, not challenged on appeal, that
"applicants who are not members of a minority are barred from partici-
pation in the special admission program. "8 Furthermore, in DeFunis
there was some question as to whether the plaintiff would have been
admitted even if there had been no minority admissions program. In
Bakke, by virtue of a counterclaim for declaratory judgment interposed
by the medical school, the constitutionality of the school's program be-
came an issue separate from the plaintiff's right to admission.
The record in Bakke is thus an unappealing vehicle for proponents
of special admissions programs. Moreover, that record will be reviewed
in a legal climate that, in the years since the decision in DeFunis, has
become less hospitable to the indiscriminate use of racial quotas to cure
society's ills.9 For example, at the time of DeFunis, it was still undecid-
ed whether and to what extent whites were protected by antidiscrimina-
tion laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 or section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11 In McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail
Transportation Co.,12 the United States Supreme Court held that all
victims of racial discrimination have the same rights under these stat-
utes. The discrimination in McDonald did not arise in the context of an
affirmative action program, and the Court in a footnote expressly de-
clined to consider the permissibility of such a program,13 but it is not
likely that this disclaimer was intended to sanction the kind of blatant
racial discrimination involved in Bakke.
Furthermore, the Court's ruling concerning the universal applica-
bility of section 1981 vitiated by analogy an argument made in DeFunis,
that because the primary purpose of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent discrimination against
blacks, a lower standard of justification should be employed when
whites are the subjects of discrimination. This argument, based on
8. 18 Cal. 3d at 44, 553 P.2d at 1159, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
9. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976);
EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 28, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); Kirkland v. New
York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); Lige v. Town of
Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976); Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350
N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976). But see United Jewish Organizations of Wil-
liamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
11. Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)).
12. 96 S. C 2574 (1976).
13. Id. at 2578 n.8.
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early decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment,14 was advanced
despite the many cases in which the Supreme Court has declared the
provisions of the amendment to be "universal in their application, to
all persons . . without regard to any differences of race."' 5 However,
none of those cases had involved racial discrimination against whites.
Although rejected both by Justice Douglas in DeFunis", and by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Bakke, 7 this argument had sufficient plausi-
bility to persuade the New York Court of Appeals in Alevy v.
Downstate Medical Center18 to abandon, at least in dictum, the "com-
pelling state interest" standard normally applied to individious racial
classifications in favor of a lesser "substantial state interest" standard
when the victim is white and the discrimination in question is "be-
nign.'
9
In McDonald, decided several months after Alevy, Mr. Justice
Marshall noted that although the "immediate impetus" for the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 "was the necessity for further relief of the constitu-
tionally emancipated former Negro slaves,"20 section one of that act2' was
meant to proscribe discrimination against or in favor of any race. He
added:
14. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
15. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695 (1898); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896).
16. 416 U.S. at 333, 342-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. 18 Cal. 3d at 50-51 n.18, 553 P.2d at 1163-64 n.18, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92
n.18.
18. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
19. Id. at 334-36, 348 N.E.2d at 544-46, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90. The dissent in
Bakke likewise sought to distinguish between "benign" and "invidious" racial classifica-
tions, arguing that the "compelling state interest standard" applies only to the latter.
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d at 65, 80, 553 P.2d at 1173, 1184,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 712 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in his concur-
ring opinion in Carey, likewise spoke of "benign discrimination"; but he expressly viewed
as being open the constitutional propriety of "benign racial sorting" in a non-voting-
rights context. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 45
U.S.L.W. 4221, 4229 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). But constitu-
tional rights would be ephemeral indeed if the applicable constitutional standard turned
upon subjective evaluations as to whether a particular discriminatory act merits one or
the other of these adjectives. Furthermore, as the Washington Supreme Court recog-
nized in DeFunis, "the minority admissions policy is certainly not benign with respect to
nonminority students who are displaced by it." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11,
32, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
20. 96 S. Ct. at 2582.
21. Act of April 9, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970)).
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Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens
would encounter substantial racial discrimination of the sort pro-
scribed under the Act, the statutory structure and legislative history
persuades us that the Thirty-ninth Congress was intent upon estab-
lishing in the federal law a broader principle than would have been
necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the
newly freed Negro slaves. "22
Such a broader principle was likewise established by the subsequently
ratified Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted
in Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Association,23 the 1866 Act,
although rooted in the Thirteenth Amendment, was re-enacted "pur-
suant to the Fourteenth and changes in wording may have reflected the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24
Issues Presented in Bakke
The position that will be taken in the Supreme Court by those
who support Bakke is predictable. The record clearly establishes that
Davis Medical School's special admissions program was inherently dis-
criminatory: white applicants were systematically excluded from six-
teen percent of the places in each entering class solely because of their
race, and some of those denied admission were, by the school's own
criteria, better qualified than many of the minority students admitted
under the auspices of the special admissions program.2 5
Furthermore, the supporters of Bakke will have the benefit of Jus-
tice Douglas's eloquent, if somewhat ambivalent, dissent in DeFunis
and also the well reasoned decision of the California Supreme Court.
Both opinions applied an exacting equal protection analysis, subjecting
the racial classification at issue to rigid scrutiny and declining to adopt
a less stringent standard of justification for discrimination merely be-
cause the victim of the discrimination was white. 6
22. 96 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
23. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
24. Id. at 439-40 n.11.
25. As the California Supreme Court noted: "The rating of some students admit-
ted under the special program in 1973 and 1974 was as much as 30 points below that
assigned to Bakke and other nonminority applicants denied admission. Furthermore,
white applicants in the general admission program with grade point averages below 2.5
were, for that reason alone, summarily denied admission, whereas some minority students
in the special program were admitted with grade point averages considerably below 2.5."
18 Cal. 3d at 48, 553 P.2d at 1161, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
26. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 333 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 19 Cal. 3d 34, 50, 553 P.2d 1152, 1163, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680, 691 (1976).
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Likewise, both opinions declined to equate cases involving the
exclusion from a professional school on the basis of race with cases such
as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,27 which in-
volved the reassignment of students and teachers to remedy de jure
segregation in the public schools, and Katzenbach v. Morgan,28 which
involved the constitutionality of a provision of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 29 protecting the right of certain non-English speaking persons to
vote. As Justice Douglas and the California Supreme Court recognized,
the holdings in these decisions deprived no one of a legally cognizable
right or benefit.30
However, there are differences of approach between the two opin-
ions. For example, Mr. Justice Douglas in DeFunis rejected the reason-
ing of the Washington Supreme Court that the objectives of the law
school constituted a compelling state interest. Arguing that no theory
of societal organization justifies the erection of racial barriers, Justice
Douglas warned: "If discrimination based on race is constitutionally
permissible when those who hold the reins can come up with 'com-
pelling' reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an
accordionlike quality."'" On the other hand, in Bakke the Supreme
Court of California assumed, arguendo, that the objectives of the
medical school to integrate the student body and to improve medical
care for minorities established a compelling state interest. However, it
ruled that the medical school had failed to meet "its burden of demon-
strating that the basic goals of the program cannot be substantially
achieved by means less detrimental to the rights of the majority."32 Such
differences are of little help to the medical school and its supporters,
given the lack of any real effort by the academic community to develop
a body of experience with racially neutral approaches to special admis-
sions. Nor are the supporters of the medical school's admissions pro-
gram helped by the fact that Justice Douglas, on the basis of the record
27. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
28. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-73 (1970).
30. 416 U.S. at 336 n.18 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 18 Cal. 3d at 46, 553 P.2d at
1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 668. Much the same reasoning was employed by Justice White
in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221, 4227
(U.S. Mar. 1, 1977). See also Califano v. Webster, 45 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Mar. 21,
1977). By contrast, it is established that an applicant to a state university has a legally
cognizable right under the equal protection clause not to be excluded on the basis of race.
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938).
31. 416 U.S. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
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in DeFunis, suggested that the case be remanded for a new trial. The
purpose of such a remand was not to justify racially discriminatory ad-
missions procedures, but rather to give the law school an opportunity
to prove that its selection process was in fact nondiscriminatory. 3
The medical school and its supporters will undoubtedly place
heavy reliance on Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center,3 4 in which the
New York Court of Appeals announced:
[I]n proper circumstances, reverse discrimination is constitutional.
However, to be so, it must be shown that a substantial interest un-
derlies the policy and practice and, further, that no nonracial, or
less objectionable racial, classifications will serve the same pur-
pose.35
Unlike Bakke, however, the record in Alevy did not establish the exist-
ence of a racial quota. Under the minority admissions program at
issue in that case, applications of minority group members were afforded
special scrutiny in the preliminary screening process, and in rating them,
such factors as financial and cultural disadvantage and residence in the
local ghetto community were considered. While holding that the
medical school practiced reverse discrimination, the court never reached
the question whether or not less objectionable alternatives existed be-
cause the petitioner had "failed to show his own, right to relief, even
if the entire minority program were eliminated. '38  Even in dicta the
court viewed its sanction of racial preference as temporary and limited:
We reiterate that preferential policies, laudable in origin and goal,
may be laden with substantial detrimental side effects which make
their use undesirable. If such practices really work, the period and
extent of their use should be temporary and limited for as goals
are achieved, their utilization should be diminished. Conversely,
if no improvement is noted, consideration should be given to the
discontinuation of the practice.37
The New York Court of Appeals directly confronted the issue of
racial quotas in Broidrick v. Lindsay,8 decided only a month after
33. As Justice Douglas stated: "I could agree with the majority of the Washington
Supreme Court only if, on the record, it could be said that the Law School's selection
was racially neutral." 416 U.S. at 312, 336 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
35. Id. at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
36. Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91. However, in Bakke, the
California Supreme Court, by analogy to federal employment discrimination cases, held
that discrimination having been established, the medical school had the burden of
proving that the plaintiff would not have been admitted even if there were no special
admissions program. 18 Cal. 3d at 63-64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The
university subsequently conceded that it could not meet this burden. Id.
37. 39 N.Y.2d at 337, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
38. 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
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Alevy. There it struck down mayoral affirmative action regulations
requiring construction contractors doing business with New York City to
meet prescribed minority hiring percentages. Noting that the mayoral
regulations were in conflict with the antidiscrimination provisions of the
New York City Administrative Code, the court stated:
There is a dramatic distinction between the expressed legisla-
tive policy of prohibiting the employment discrimination and the
mayoral policy of mandating employment "percentages," however
disavowed unpersuasively as being quotas. Prohibition of discrim-
ination, properly utilized, allows individual employment opportun-
ity without invidious impediments. . . . But mandating percent-
ages displaces the standard of individual merit with a standard that
work forces reflect the ethnic composition within the relevant geo-
graphic area even if distribution based on merit would produce a
different composition. 9
Interestingly, Alevy is cited in Broidrick for the proposition that an
affirmative action policy might be permitted if designed to add previous-
ly excluded minority workers to the pool of those eligible for employ-
ment in a given profession.40 However, lest its holding in Alevy be
given an overly expansive interpretation, the court warned that neither
that opinion nor Broidrick found the use of racial quotas in higher edu-
cation admissions programs to be constitutional.41 In sum, a reading
of Alevy together with Broidrick makes clear that the language in Alevy
indicating a tentative approval of certain types of racial preference in
professional school admissions cannot be considered as condoning a
racial quota such as that involved in Bakke.
Despite Broidrick, the proponents of racially based special admis-
sions programs will probably seek to analogize them to affirmative action
programs in employment that have withstood judicial attack.42 How-
ever, most of these cases have involved affirmative action programs in
the construction trades, which have a long history of discriminating
against minority groups. Furthermore, while sustaining goals and time-
tables for the hiring of minority group members, the courts have gener-
ally made clear that such judicially-sanctioned selection processes must
be nondiscriminatory. 43
39. Id. at 647, 350 N.E.2d at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 649, 350 N.E.2d at 599-600, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
42. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9
(1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v.
Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n of . Pa. v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
43. For example, in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, the plan at
issue expressly provided: "This commitment is not intended and shall not be used to
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The courts have been less cautious in ordering racial quotas or
quota equivalents as a remedy in employment discrimination cases." An
increasing number of courts are coming to realize, however, that the
racial quota is no less destructive of individual aspirations, no less a
divider of society, and no less a moral wrong because those excluded are
white. For example, in Kirkland v. New York State Department of
Correctional Services,45 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in striking down a promotional quota, stated:
One of the most controversial areas in our continuing search
for equal employment opportunity is the use of judicially imposed
employment quotas. The replacement of individual rights and
opportunities by a system of statistical classifications based on race
is repugnant to the basic concepts of a democratic society.
The most ardent supporters of quotas as a weapon in the fight
against discrimination have recognized their undemocratic ineq-
ities and conceded that their use should be limited. Commentators
merely echo the judiciary in their disapproval of the "discrimina-
tion inherent in a quota system."'46
While the United States Supreme Court has authorized the granting
of restitution to identifiable victims of discrimination,47 it has not passed
discriminate against any qualified applicant or employee." 442 F.2d at 164. In
Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc., the court viewed the contract
requirements there at issue as affording "racial preference" or "special treatment" to
minority group members. However, it cautioned against "unrealistic minority hiring
goals" which "might impose an unreasonable burden . . . upon qualified workers who
were denied jobs because they were not members of the racial minority." Further, it
warned that "equal opportunity is an illusive concept, but at its core it carries the simple
mandate that opportunities should be open to all on the basis of competence alone." 490
F.2d at 18.
44. See, e.g., NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (Ist Cir. 1974); Rios v.
Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1974).
45. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 73 (1976).
46. Id. at 427. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 28, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit, relying upon
Kirkland, enunciated the following rule: "[Tihe imposition of racial goals is to be
tolerated only when past discrimination has been clear-cut and the effects of 'reverse
discrimination' will be diffused among an unidentifiable group of unknown, potential
applicants rather than upon an ascertainable group of easily identifiable persons." Id. at
828. Interestingly, the court indicated that the facts in DeFunis would not have justified
"reverse discrimination" under this rule. Id. In Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5,
367 A.2d 833 (1976), the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down hiring and promo-
tional quotas imposed by a state administrative agency as violative of both the New Jer-
sey law against discrimination and the New Jersey Constitution. The court, among other
things, observed that the use of quotas to right past wrongs raises the spectre of conflict-
ing interests among minority groups. It declared: "We are a state of minorities." Id.
at 24, 367 A.2d at 843.
47. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The Court
held that "identifiable applicants who were denied employment because of race after
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upon the constitutionality of racial quotas in employment even as a rem-
edy for past discrimination. The Supreme Court has recently sanc-
tioned the use of racial quotas and redistricting under the Voting Rights
Act.4" However, in the context of a case involving de jure segregation
in a public school system,49 the Court sustained the use of mathematical
ratios as a "starting point in the process of shaping a remedy"50 but
specifically declined to endorse a fixed racial balance or quota.5'
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,52 the Court construed Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as prohibiting "[dliscriminatory prefer-
ence for any group, minority or majority."53  This ruling was recently
reiterated in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.54 Absent
the showing of a compelling state interest, traditional equal protection
analysis yields the same result under the Fourteenth Amendment when
state action results in a discriminatory racial classification.55 It remains
to be seen to what extent the Court will find the use of racial quotas
as a remedy for past discrimination compatible with the prohibition
against "discriminatory preference."
No past discrimination against minority group members was shown
in Bakke,56 however. It therefore seems safe to predict that the Court
will not countenance the medical school's racial quota unless it is con-
vinced that there is no less invidious way to achieve social progress.
Conclusion
For the last quarter of a century, our nation, spearheaded by the
Supreme Court, has been engaged in an effort to make the twin ideals of
equality under law and equality of opportunity a living reality by
the effective date and in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" may,
and, in most circumstances should, be awarded seniority status retroactive to the dates
of their employment applications. Id. at 750. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413 (1975).
48. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221
(U.S. Mar. 1, 1977).
49. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
50. Id. at 25.
51. Id. at 24. See Winston-Salem Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1227
(1971).
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. Id. at 431.
54. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 US. 14, 191-92 (1964).
56. 18 Cal. 3d at 59, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697. Under the Court's
recent holding in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), mere underrepresentation
of minority group members or the possibility that they were disproportionately affected
(Vol. 3
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eliminating once and for all the blight of racial discrimination. What is
so controversial and potentially destructive about special admissions
programs like those involved in Bakke is that they utilize racial quotas
and preference, the traditional engines of discrimination, as the vehicle
for social progress. But, even assuming that such programs can succeed
in producing qualified professional people in large numbers, an as-
sumption that has not been proven, their social cost is high indeed.
They denigrate the individual, exalt immutable birth characteristics,
stigmatize those preferentially admitted,57 and victimize those excluded
because of their race.
All of this might be justified if there were indeed no other way to
assist minority group members to participate fully in the mainstream of
American life. However, that has yet to be demonstrated. Justice
Douglas's opinion in DeFunis and that of the California Supreme Court
in Bakke contain a variety of suggestions for encouraging the enrollment
of minority group members in professional schools without the use of
racially discriminatory procedures.58 Officials of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund and the Mexican-American Legal Defense
Fund have acknowledged that they "could live with" a program based
on disadvantage.59 Yet, as previously noted, 6° the academic community
has apparently not seen fit to develop a "real body of experience in
dealing with a disadvantagement approach to special admissions." 61
At a time when employers, both private and public, are being
required to re-evaluate criteria for hiring and promotion in order to
by certain admissions criteria would be insufficient to establish discrimination in an
equal protection context. There must be a showing of "an invidious discriminatory
purpose." Id. at 242.
57. Justice Douglas in his DeFunis opinion spoke of the "stigma" inherent in "[a]
segregated admissions process"-the implication "that blacks or browns cannot make it
on their individual merit." 416 U.S. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In an article in
the opinion-editorial section of the New York Times, David L. Evans, Senior Admis-
sions Officer of Harvard, complained: "So much has been written about the illegitimacy
of special recruiting efforts for minority students, black students' disillusionment and
'reverse discrimination' that the mere presence of blacks at selective institutions has more
and more begun to imply substandard credentials." He added: "Black students who
come to Harvard far too often receive the coolest, most ambivalent reception given to
any upwardly-mobile ethnic group that has ever entered these ivied walls." N.Y. Times,
Nov. 24, 1976, at 33, col. 1.
58. 416 U.S. at 340-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 18 Cal. 3d at 54-56, 553 P.2d at
1165-67, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693-95.
59. See The Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1976, at Al, col. 5; id. at A13, col. 1;
id., Nov. 20, 1976, at A13, col. 1.
60. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
61. SPECIAL ADMISSIONS, supra note 4, atS.
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remove discriminatory bars, it is unseemly for the academic community
to persist in its use of racial quotas and preference without a similar
re-evaluation. The process will not be simple or inexpensive. However,
as Justice Douglas observed in DeFunis, "[W]e have never held adminis-
trative convenience to justify racial discrimination." '  The stakes are
far too high for a society desperately trying to rid itself of racial
discrimination to accept on faith the claim that the only way to achieve
equality in the professions is by practicing still more racial discrimina-
tion.
62. 416 U.S. at 341 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
